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INTRODUCTION

This year's Survey article focuses on significant decisions of the
United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court during
the survey period. It addresses both constitutional and statutory
issues. What follows is a survey, not a catalogue of each case or
each issue which the courts decided.
I.

A.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The United States Supreme Court
1. Searches

During the 1988 Survey year, the United States Supreme Court
decided three cases involving searches and seizures. The first case
concerned an individual's expectation of privacy in garbage left for
collection outside the curtilage of a home. In Californiav. Greenwood'
the Court upheld the warrantless search of the defendants' trash
which they had left for collection at the curb in opaque plastic bags.
Justice White's opinion for the Court applied the two part test
developed in Katz v. United States.2 The Katz test first requires a

1. 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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court to determine whether the individual had a subjective expectation of privacy in the item searched. If so, the court then decides
if that expectation is one which society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
Justice White conceded that the defendants may have had a
subjective expectation of privacy in their trash, however, it was not
one which society accepts as objectively reasonable.' First, Justice
White indicated it is "common knowledge" that garbage left at the
curb is "readily accessible" to animals, children, scavengers, and
snoops. Second, defendants placed their trash at the curb for the
express purpose of turning it over to a third party, the trash
collector. 4 Thus, the defendants had "exposed their garbage to the
pubic sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection." 5 By defining the issue as "whether the Fourth Amendment
prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for
collection outside the curtilage of a home," the Court left open the
possibility of holding a search of garbage within the curtilage of a
home unreasonable.
Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justice Marshall in
dissent, predicted that "society will be shocked" to learn of the
majority's decision.6 Relying on cases holding warrantless searches
of containers in the defendant's possession unreasonable, 7 and a
municipal ordinance requiring residents to dispose of their trash by
leaving it on the curb for collection, Justice Brennan stated that
"[a] trash bag, like any [other container], 'is a common repository
for one's personal effects,' and, even more than many of them, is
'therefore ... inevitably associated with the expectation of pri8
vacy.'
2.

Seizures

In Michigan v. Chesternut,9 the Court decided the question of
whether police pursuit, without more, necessarily results in a "sei3. 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
4. Id. at 1629 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the numbers dialed on a telephone because they are voluntarily conveyed to the
telephone company)).
5. 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
6. Id. at 1632 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Robins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (totebag); Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979) (small, unlocked suitcase); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(double-locked footlocker).
8. 108 S. Ct. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).
9. 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988).
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zure" of the individual pursued. In Chesternut, the Detroit police
observed an individual flee as their marked cruiser approached the
corner where he was standing. The police followed him around the
corner and accelerated to catch up, driving alongside him for several
seconds. While running, the defendant discarded several packets
containing pills which the police recovered. The defendant stopped
running after the police recovered the packets. He was then arrested
and police found more contraband on his person. Justice Blackmun,
writing for a unanimous Court, applied the test first suggested in
United States v. Mendenhal ° and held that "the police conduct
involved [in this case] would not have communicated to the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon respondent's freedom of movement."'" Therefore, he was not in custody
when he dropped the items. The Court did not decide the broader
question of whether a police chase can ever result in a seizure under
the fourth amendment. The Court also left open the question of
whether flight alone gives the police reasonable suspicion to detain
someone.
Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and Justice Scalia in a
concurring opinion, stated that defendant's "unprovoked flight gave
the police ample cause to stop him."1 2 Justice Kennedy also indicated
that fourth amendment protections are not implicated until the police
conduct actually "achieves a restraining effect." 3
3.

Independent Source Doctrine

In Murray v. United States 4 the Supreme Court held that the
"independent source" doctrine 5 allows the admission of evidence
seized during a legal search even if that evidence was also observed
during a prior illegal search. Acting on an informant's tip, federal
agents began watching Murray and several co-conspirators. The
agents broke into defendants' warehouse and observed numerous
burlap-wrapped bales of marijuana. They did not disturb the bales.
The agents then obtained a search warrant for the warehouse,

10. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Police have seized an individual "only if, in view of all
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave.").
11. 108 S. Ct. at 1980.
12. Id. at 1981 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
13. Id.
14. 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
15. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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however, they did not mention the prior entry nor rely on any

observations made during the entry in their search warrant affidavit.
The agents then reentered the warehouse and seized 270 bales of
marijuana. Defendant Murray and others were arrested for conspiracy to possess and distribute illegal drugs. 16 The district court denied
17
a motion to suppress and the First Circuit affirmed.

In an opinion by Justice Scalia the Court extended the "independent source" doctrine from evidence which was not observed
during the earlier illegal search, 8 to evidence which was discovered
during the illegal search. The Court reasoned that while the purpose
of the exclusionary rule is to prevent the police from profiting from

their illegal activity, it should not place them in a worse position
than they otherwise would have occupied.' 9 As long as the lawful
search is genuinely independent of the earlier, illegal one, the "independent source" doctrine will apply. 20 The Court remanded for a

determination of whether the agents would have sought a warrant
2
if they had not earlier entered the warehouse. '
B.

The Illinois Supreme Court
1. Staleness

In People v. Thompkins, 22 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
a novel search warrant staleness issue. The defendant challenged a
search warrant which authorized the seizure of telephone extension

cords, blood stains, and hair fibers in connection with a murder
investigation. The warrant was issued almost three months after the
crime was committed. The defendant claimed that "it [was] not
reasonable to presume that the items sought in the search warrant"
were in existence.2 3 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected "an arbitrary

16. 108 S. Ct. at 2532.
17. United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1985).
18. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (cocaine and drug trafficking records
admissible under "independent source" doctrine when not discovered by police during 19
hour stay in apartment prior to securing a warrant).
19. 108 S. Ct. at 2535.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2536. Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, argued that the majority's
opinion will provide an incentive for police to make illegal, "confirmatory" searches to save
themselves the trouble of getting a warrant if no evidence is present. Id. at 2538 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissenting opinion in which he reaffirmed his
disagreement with Segura as providing an affirmative incentive for government agents to
engage in unconstitutional violations. Id. at 2540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. 121 Ill.
2d 401, 521 N.E.2d 38, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 187 (1988).
23. Id. at 435, 521 N.E.2d at 52.
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cutoff period expressed in days or weeks beyond which probable
cause ceases to exist .

",24

Instead, the court adopted a case-by-

case evaluation of probable cause. Relying on the Second Circuit
approach in United States v. Beltempo, 25 the Illinois Supreme Court
stated:
[C]ourts have found other factors to be as important as the time
element: "[These factors] include the nature of the object sought,
its location on the premises and the state in which it was observed.
The nature of the object would encompass such considerations as
whether it is large or small, moveable or fixed, disposable or
permanent and innocuous or incriminating. The location of an
object on the premises would involve, for example, whether it was
in plain sight on a table, locked in a safe, on a beam in a cellar
or secreted behind a bricked-in wall. The state in which the object
was seen is especially important today because modern technology
and equipment have the sophisticated capacity to ascertain whether
matter-in whatever form it may be-is present or even may have
once been present. This technology can detect, for example, a
blood stain on clothes, furniture or rug; a gas that evaporates; a
solid that dissolves and disappears, or one that changes into a
powder or a liquid that seeps into a fabric, or dust that is suspended
in air and whose particles may later be found on the top ledge of
a door. The inquiry with respect to probable cause in the case of
an observation of an isolated incident should focus on all of the
relevant circumstances, including the element of time lapse, to
determine the probability of the continued existence of the object
sought at the place where it was last seen. The overall approach
should be one of flexibility and common sense. 26
Applying the foregoing factors, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that there was a fair probability that the items mentioned in the
search warrant were still in existence. In reaching this conclusion
the court stated:
A telephone cord is an article which could reasonably be expected
to be kept in a home for extended periods, it is designed for long
term use, likely to be functional, and not contraband or likely to
be disposed of for any apparent reason. Furthermore, it is reasonable
to believe that blood stains on a concrete floor which neither bleach

24. Id.
25. 675 F.2d 472, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982).
26. 121 Il. 2d at 435-36, 521 N.E.2d at 52-53 (quoting United States v. Beltempo, 675
F.2d 472, 478 (2d Cir. 1982)).
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nor acid could remove would still be detectable a few months
27
later .
2.

Probable Cause

Gacho21

In People v.
the Illinois Supreme Court, applying a
liberal standard for determining probable cause for a warrantless
arrest, affirmed the trial judge's ruling denying a motion to quash
the arrest. In Gacho, the victim gave the first officer to arrive at
the scene a name sounding similar to that of the defendant. When
responding to other officer's inquiries, he gave the proper pronunciation of the defendant's name. The investigators later learned from
the victim's brother that the victim, who lived in the same area as
the defendant, had gone with another person to the defendant's
house the night before. The police went to the address of the
defendant's residence, and when they saw a man who matched the
defendant's description, they arrested him. The court concluded that
under these circumstances the collective information known to the
investigators would warrant a person of reasonable caution in be29
lieving that the person arrested had committed the offense.
3.

Exclusionary Rule

James,0

In People v.
a divided Illinois Supreme Court expanded
the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule by allowing the
impeachment of a defense witness' testimony with a statement of
the defendant which the trial court had previously suppressed under
the fourth amendment. 3 Prior to trial, the defendant, who was
charged with murder and attempted murder, filed a motion to
suppress statements which he had made to the police following his
arrest. The trial judge granted the motion and suppressed the statements finding that there was no probable cause for the arrest and
that the statements were the fruits of the unlawful arrest. At trial,
the State's eyewitnesses testified that the perpetrator had shoulder
length reddish hair which was worn slicked-back "butter" style. The
witnesses also made in-court identifications of the defendant whose
hair was then black and worn in a natural style.3 2

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 436, 521 N.E.2d at 53 (citation omitted).
122 I11.2d 221, 522 N.E.2d 1146, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 264 (1988).
122 111.
2d at 235, 522 N.E.2d at 1153.
123 I11. 2d 523, 528 N.E.2d 723 (1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1117 (1989).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
123 I11. 2d at 526-27, 528 N.E.2d at 724.
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The principal defense witness at trial was Jewel Henderson, a
friend of the defendant's family. She testified that on the day of
the shooting she had been with the defendant and that his hair was
black. To "impeach" and to rebut her testimony, the prosecutor
sought to introduce a previously suppressed statement of the defendant. The substance of the suppressed statement, which the trial
judge admitted for impeachment, was introduced by the testimony
of a police officer. It revealed that while in police custody on August
31, the defendant told the police that on the evening of August 30,
the date of the shooting, his hair was long, combed back straight,
and "reddish" in color. He also said that he went to his mother's
beauty parlor on August 31 to dye and curl his hair to change his
appearance. Following the officer's testimony, the trial judge orally
instructed the jury that the testimony was "offered for the purpose
of impeaching the testimony of Miss Henderson who stated to you
that the defendant's hair was black. This evidence is offered to
refute and rebut that testimony, that it was not black but it was red
at the point the officer said the defendant told him it was red.""
The defendant did not object to the instruction or offer an alternative
instruction. At the close of the evidence, the trial judge refused the
defense's proffered jury instruction which explained that "the defendant's statement could be considered only for purposes of determining the believability of the witness and could not be used as
'3 4
substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt or innocence."
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated to the jury
during his rebuttal that the "case comes to you with five eyewitnesses, an admission that he changed his color-changed the color
of his hair."" The defendant did not testify, and the jury found
him guilty of murder and attempted murder. The Illinois Appellate
Court reversed. Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Havens 6 and a number of Illinois cases, the
prosecutor argued that the appellate court had erred in reversing the
convictions. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. It reasoned that
Walder v. United States,3 7 Harris v. New York,3" and United States
v. Havens 9 support a constitutional basis for an impeachment

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
446
347
401
446

at 527-28, 528 N.E.2d at 725.
at 528, 528 N.E.2d at 725.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

620 (1980).
62 (1954).
222 (1971).
620 (1980).
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exception to the exclusionary rule, stating that "[t]he laudable purposes of the rule notwithstanding, it does not follow that defendants
may transform it into a shield for knowing perjury or intentional
misrepresentation.' ' 40 While the Illinois Supreme Court recognized
that in prior cases involving an impeachment exception it was the
defendant who had testified and that it was his testimony which had
been impeached with suppressed evidence, it found no problem in
extending the exception to the impeachment of a defense witness.
The court stated:
In our view, if a defendant is prohibited from using perjury by
way of a defense, it matters not from whose lips that perjury
comes. Just as a defendant may not directly perjure himself and
then hide behind the exclusionary rule, he also cannot be allowed
to use perjurious testimony through a biased defense witness, in
this case the principal defense witness, without affording the
prosecution an opportunity to challenge the veracity of that
4
testimony. '

A.

II. CONFESSIONS
ReinterrogationAfter Invocation Of Silence

In People v. Foster,42 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed a
controversial question left open by the United States Supreme Court
in Michigan v. Mosley, 4 whether police officers may reinterrogate

an accused on the same crime after he invokes the fifth amendment
protection of silence. 44 In Mosley, the United States Supreme Court
40. 123 I11.
2d at 535, 528 N.E.2d at 728.
41. Id. at 536, 528 N.E.2d at 729.
42. 119 Ill. 2d 69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2044 (1988).
43. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
44. In Foster, the defendant, Lloyd, Chapman, and Williams were taken to the Aurora,
Illinois, police station at approximately 2 a.m. Detective Martin and Sergeant Strover first
questioned Williams. She told them that it was the defendant who beat the victim using his
hands, feet, and a baseball bat. Martin and Strover then took the defendant from his lockup
cell at approximately 6:30 a.m. to a room in the investigation division of the station for
questioning. When Martin began to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights, the defendant
interrupted him and said: "I know she's dead. I have got nothing to say." Martin and
Strover then returned him to the lockup cell. At 9:30 a.m., Assistant State's Attorney Sullivan
arrived at the Aurora police station, and at his request, Investigators Needham and Tiegelman
brought the defendant to an interview room. Sullivan advised the defendant of his Miranda
rights, told him that Williams had given a statement implicating him in the murder, and said
they also spoke to Lloyd. The defendant stated that he understood his Miranda rights and
proceeded to tell Sullivan, Needham, and Tiegelman that he beat the victim to death. After
giving this oral statement, the defendant signed both a statement in which he waived his
Miranda rights and a typed confession. 119 Ill.
2d at 86, 518 N.E.2d at 89.
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held that statements obtained from an accused who had previously
expressed a desire to remain silent during police initiated renewed
interrogation are admissible if the police had scrupulously honored
the suspect's right to cut off questioning. 45 Mosley rejected the
contention that Miranda v. Arizona46 had established a per se ban
on renewed interrogation after invocation of silence by the accused.
However, the Mosley analysis involved renewed interrogation on
another crime. Here, the Illinois Supreme Court was looking at
renewed interrogation on the same crime. The Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that the distinction was of no consequence. What matters
is whether the accused's right to remain silent was scrupulously
honored by the police.47 The court stated: "That a defendant was
later questioned regarding the same offense does not of itself mean
that his rights under Miranda were violated. There have been numerous decisions that this circumstance does not preclude a finding
that an accused's right to remain silent was 'scrupulously honored."'48
B.

Invocation Of Right To Counsel

In Arizona v. Roberson4 9 the Supreme Court resolved a conflict
among state courts and held that the police cannot reinterrogate a
suspect who has requested counsel even when the second interrogation is by a different officer and concerns an unrelated investigation.
In Edwards v. Arizona50 the Court held that a suspect who has
"expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel
is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police."'" In Roberson, the defendant was arrested on April 16, 1985,
at the scene of a just-completed burglary. Roberson, after being
read his Miranda rights, requested counsel before answering questions.12 This fact was recorded in the officer's written report. On
April 19, 1985, a second officer, unaware of Roberson's earlier

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
119 I11.
2d at 85-86, 518 N.E.2d at 89.
Id. at 86-87, 518 N.E.2d at 89 (citations omitted).
108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988).
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Id. at 484-85.
108 S. Ct. at 2096.

HeinOnline -- 13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 520 1988-1989

1989]

Criminal Procedure

invocation of the right to counsel, informed him of his Miranda
rights and interrogated him about a burglary which occurred on
April 15, 1985.1 Roberson made an incriminating statement concerning the April 15th burglary which was suppressed at trial on the
4
authority of Edwards. The suppression was affirmed on appeal.1
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
Edwards rule provides "clear and unequivocal guidelines" to the
police. In addition, the "bright line" rule of Edwards is equally
applicable when the reinterrogation involves a separate investigation
because once a suspect has requested counsel, he has indicated that
he is not competent to deal with the police without legal advice.
Thus, a later decision at the authority's insistence to make a statement without counsel is the product of "inherently compelling
pressures." 55
Justice Stevens attached no significance to the fact that the
officer who conducted the second interrogation did not know that
Roberson had requested counsel.16 First, the Edwards rule focuses
on the state of mind of the suspect, not the police. Second, custodial
interrogation is conducted according to established procedures and
those procedures must enable an officer to determine if the suspect
has previously requested counsel.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent,
stated that a per se rule was unnecessary. Justice Kennedy argued
that a rule which relies upon known and tested warnings to insure
that a waiver is voluntary would be sufficient to protect a suspect's
rights. 7
In People v. Holland,8 the Illinois Supreme Court examined a
critical fifth amendment waiver of rights issue under Miranda v.
Arizona,5 9 whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights to silence and counsel where his interrogators, assistant
state's attorneys and police officers, failed to inform him that an
attorney wanted to confer with him prior to any interrogation or
lineup.
The following facts are essential to an understanding of the
court's analysis. The defendant was initially arrested and taken into

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 2096-97.
Id. at 2097-98.
Id. at 2101.
Id. at 2104 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
121 Il1. 2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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custody by Schiller Park, Illinois, police officers for a number of
motor vehicle code violations at approximately 8:00 a.m. on May
4, 1980.60 The Schiller Park police then contacted Detective John
Meese of the Des Plaines police department regarding the arrest of
the defendant. The defendant matched the description of an abduction offender who was sought by the Des Plaines police for kidnapping and rape. Meese asked that the defendant be photographed and
held pending further investigation. Meese then obtained the defendant's photograph from the Schiller Park police and presented it,
along with six others, to the victim. After she identified the defendant
as her assailant, Meese made arrangements to transport the defendant
to the Des Plaines police station. Prior to moving the defendant,
Meese spoke by telephone with Attorney Anthony Rocco, who
represented himself as defendant's attorney. Rocco asked to be
notified if the defendant were to stand in a lineup. Meese telephoned
Rocco later that afternoon and left a message that the defendant
would be placed in a lineup. Meese then transported the defendant
to the Des Plaines station. Upon arrival, Meese advised him of his
Miranda rights. Two assistant state's attorneys then interviewed the
defendant. That interview, at which Meese was also present, began
at approximately 2:05 p.m. on the afternoon of May 4.61
An assistant state's attorney advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. Holland indicated he understood his rights, agreed to
talk, and proceeded to give a false exculpatory statement. The
assistant state's attorney then walked out of the interrogation room
leaving the defendant alone with Detective Meese. At approximately
2:30 p.m., the same assistant state's attorney reentered the interrogation room, advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, and
Holland once again indicated he understood his rights. He then
proceeded to give an incriminating statement. 62 The assistant state's
attorney then left the room and spoke to the defendant's attorney,

60. A Schiller Park police officer stopped the defendant's vehicle because it did not have
a rear license plate. The officer ordered a driver's license check and learned that the
defendant's license had been revoked. While awaiting the results of the driver's license check,
the officer noticed that defendant's car, clothing, and his physical appearance matched
information which was contained in an abduction report relating to an occurrence in Des
Plaines, Illinois, at approximately 6 a.m. on May 4, 1980. The defendant was arrested for
improper vehicle registration, driving on a revoked license, and illegal transportation of
alcohol and was transported to the Schiller Park police station. 121 Ill. 2d at 142-43, 520
N.E.2d at 272-73.
61. Id. at 143, 520 N.E.2d at 273.
62. Id. at 145, 520 N.E.2d at 274.
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Anthony Rocco. Rocco wanted to know what charges would be filed
but did not ask to be present during any interviews or interrogations.
The assistant state's attorney was aware that Rocco had called the
Des Plaines police station but was unaware of any request to speak
with the defendant prior to any interrogation. At approximately
4:00 p.m., the assistant state's attorney informed Rocco of the
6 3
charges against the defendant.
The defendant's wife testified at the suppression hearing that
around 8:30 a.m. on May 4, 1980, a Schiller Park officer notified
her that her husband had been arrested for several traffic violations
and that she should come to the station to post bond. Later that
morning, she was informed that her husband was being held for
Des Plaines police officers, who were preparing other charges against
him. She was not told what charges were contemplated. She then
contacted Attorney Rocco and requested that he represent her husband. She reached him around 1:00 p.m. During the afternoon, she
spoke to him on several occasions. During each conversation, Rocco
related his unsuccessful efforts to see her husband. She further
testified that she met Rocco at the Des Plaines police station around
3:45 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Rocco was allowed to meet with the
defendant.64
The defendant testified that he had spoken to his wife by
telephone around 8:30 a.m. on May 4, 1980, while held in the
custody of the Schiller Park police. He told her to contact attorney
Rocco to arrange for his release. 65 Rocco did not testify but during
his closing argument at the suppression hearing, he stated that he
had talked to Detective Meese by telephone around 1:00 p.m. and
specifically requested to talk to the defendant prior to any questioning. Rocco also argued that sometime between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m.,
he had made the same request of the assistant state's attorney who
was in charge of the interrogation. Rocco concluded his argument
by noting that he was not permitted to see the defendant until after
Holland had given an incriminating statement and been placed in a
lineup. 66 The defendant argued to the Illinois Supreme Court that a
Miranda waiver is invalid unless the suspect is first informed by his
interrogators, prior to the interrogation, that his attorney requested

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 146, 520 N.E.2d at 274.
Id.
Id. at 148, 520 N.E.2d at 274-75.

HeinOnline -- 13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 523 1988-1989

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

to speak to him. He urged the court to read the state constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, 67 more broadly than the federal
privilege, realizing that a claim under the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution would probably fail in light of the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Moran v. Burbine.61 In Burbine,
the United States Supreme Court did not preclude the states from
formulating more stringent standards under state law for evaluating
69
a waiver of rights during police initiated custodial interrogation.
The Illinois Supreme Court in a lock-step approach declined the
invitation to apply a different standard under Illinois law. 70 In
applying the Burbine analysis, the court upheld the waiver here,
reasoning:
Here, as in Burbine, a relative secured counsel for the suspect; the
suspect was unaware that counsel had been retained; all
communication between the police or prosecutors and the attorney
was by telephone ....
Applying Burbine, we hold that the defendant
was given his Miranda rights at the Des Plaines police station, that
he understood the nature of those rights, and that his Miranda
waiver was valid despite the fact that he was not told that an
attorney wanted to confer with him prior to any interrogation or
7
lineup. '
This analysis is wrong. Holland had asked his wife to contact his
attorney and for counsel to arrange for his release. The conclusion
of the court cannot be sustained under Burbine.
In People v. Thompkins, 72 the defendant contended that statements which he had given the police were improperly introduced at
his murder trial because they were obtained in violation of his fifth
and sixth amendment rights. An attorney testified that following the

67. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10.
68. 475 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1986). In Burbine,
[tihe Supreme Court concluded that a suspect's knowing and intelligent waiver of
his Miranda rights does not require knowledge that an attorney has been retained
or information that the attorney has been in contact with the police or has attempted
to see the suspect. The Court held that "[o]nce it is determined that a suspect's
decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could
stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the state's intention to
use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver
is valid as a matter of law."
121 111.2d at 152, 520 N.E.2d at 277 (citation omitted).
69. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 428.
70. 121 Ill. 2d at 153, 520 N.E.2d at 277-78.
71. Id.
72. 121 I11. 2d 401, 521 N.E.2d 38, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 187 (1988).
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defendant's arrest, he was contacted by the defendant's wife about
representing him. The attorney telephoned the defendant at the police

station and instructed him to refrain from making any statements
to the authorities. The attorney was never retained as counsel for
the defendant."

The Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time of the
interrogation because formal adversary judicial proceedings had not

been initiated against him. The defendant had not been indicted at
the time; only a complaint for preliminary examination charging
him with murder had been issued. "The complaint did not constitute
a formal commitment by the People to prosecute [the] defendant.

'7 4

The supreme court also held that the defendant did not invoke his
fifth amendment right to counsel merely by "speaking with an
attorney whom he wished to retain after having received the Miranda
warnings." ' 75 The record showed that the defendant acknowledged
his understanding of each of his rights and that he then freely spoke

to the police. The court concluded that the defendant "unequivocally
waived his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of
76
counsel."
In People v. Enoch, 77 the court examined a claim that the
defendant's statements were the product of an impermissible police
interrogation after he had invoked the right to counsel. Following

73. Investigator Houlihan and another investigator interrogated the defendant on March
18, 1981, while he was in the lockup area next to the preliminary hearing courtroom awaiting
his initial court appearance and bond hearing. The defendant was advised of his Miranda
rights, acknowledged his understanding, and elected to proceed with the interrogation without
the assistance of counsel. The interrogation lasted approximately 1 1/2 hours. The defendant
admitted participating in the shootings, gave details of the incident, and expressed a desire
to give a statement to assistant state's attorney Perry. Perry was summoned but then the
defendant refused to make a statement because he had just spoken by telephone with his
attorney, George Howard, and was advised not to make any statements. George Howard was
contacted by the defendant's wife on March 17, 1981, regarding the representation of the
defendant. Howard telephoned the defendant at the Cook County sheriff's police department,
briefly spoke with him, and instructed him not to make any statements. Howard was never
retained as the defendant's attorney, nor did he ever file an appearance on the defendant's
behalf in the case. The defendant testified that he understood the Miranda rights given to
him and that he knew that he had the right to have an attorney present. He told the officer
that he would not make any statements because his attorney would arrive shortly and any
deals would be worked out with his attorney. The defendant specifically denied giving a
statement to the investigators. Id. at 431-32, 521 N.E.2d at 50-51.
74. 121 Ill. 2d at 433, 521 N.E.2d at 51.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 434, 521 N.E.2d at 52.
77. 122 I11.2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 274 (1988).
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the defendant's arrest, he was given Miranda warnings. He said he
wanted an attorney. A police officer then explained the procedure
for getting an attorney and told the defendant that he would be
taken to the county jail and booked for murder. The defendant
asked whose murder was in question, and an officer replied the
murder of Kay Burns. Another officer told him that they had a
witness who had seen him leave her apartment. The defendant then
said "Oh no, not Kay Burns," and added that he had walked her
to within a block of her apartment on the night in question.7" The
trial judge held that the defendant's statements were voluntary and
not the product of police interrogation. On appeal, emphasizing the
testimony of one police officer that the defendant was told that a
witness had seen him leave the victim's apartment, the defendant
claimed that his statements were the result of police interrogation.
The supreme court found that the trial judge's finding was not
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The court stated
that "informing the defendant that he was being booked for the
murder of Kay Burns was clearly a police action 'normally attendant
79
to arrest and custody' and therefore not interrogation.
Whether the defendant invoked his right to counsel under Miranda,80 and whether he subsequently waived that right were questions
raised in an unusual setting in People v. St. Pierre."'Initially, it is
important to note that police officers had advised the murder defendant of his fifth amendment rights three times. At no time did
he ask for an attorney, and he was willing to give a statement. He
was stopped, however, and told to wait for the arrival of an assistant
state's attorney. Subsequently the assistant state's attorney admonished the defendant of his rights. 82 The defendant made a request

78. Id. at 192, 522 N.E.2d at 1133.
79. Id. at 193-94, 522 N.E.2d at 1133.
80. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81. 122 Il. 2d 95, 522 N.E.2d 61 (1988).
82. The record, reprinted below, sets forth the conversation between the assistant state's
attorney and the defendant.
Q. [By Assistant State's Attorney Leiberman] Robert, I'll call you Bobbie, all
right?
A. [By Robert St. Pierre] Yeah.
Q. Bobbie, I want to tell you that you have the right to remain silent. Do you
understand that right?
A. Yes.
Q. You understand that anything you say can and will be used against you in
a court of law?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand that you have a right to talk to a lawyer and have him

HeinOnline -- 13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 526 1988-1989

19891

Criminal Procedure

for counsel and then gave a statement admitting to acts concerning

present with you before and while you are being questioned?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand that if you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be
appointed by the court to represent you before any questioning?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you wish one?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you like to speak to a lawyer now?
A. No, no, after, that comes after, right?
Q. You could have a lawyer if you want one.
A. No, that's okay.
Q. So you prefer to talk to us now, today, without a lawyer being present?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand each of the above rights I have just read to you?
A. Yes.
Q. You want to make a statement to us today about what happened over at
9151 Karlov?
A. No.
Q. No, you don't want to talk to us?
A. Oh, yeah, I want to tell you about it, you know.
Q. Understanding each of these rights, do you want to talk to us now?
A. Yes.
Q. Why don't you tell me what happened from the very beginning?
A. Well, I met Barry in a bar with Sandy and we talked.
Q. Before we go any further, there seems to be a little confusion as to a
couple of your rights. I think it's best that we go over them again. Do you
understand that you have a right to have a lawyer with you and to talk to you
before we have this interview, and you have the right to have him present during
this interview. Do you understand that?
A. I can have him here, and he can help me out?
Q. It's your choice.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you understand that? Do you want to have one here now?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that mean you do not want to give a statement without a lawyer
being here? Are you confused as to that?
A. Yeah. I don't know what you guys want.
Q. It's whatever you want to tell us, whatever you want to do. Do you want
to give a statement today?
A. Oh, yeah, today.
Q. Supposedly there is no lawyer in the room with us. If you want, you can
have a lawyer here with you, your own lawyer that can talk to you about anything
you might want to talk to us about. Do you understand that?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you want to have a lawyer in the room here today when you make a
statement, or do you prefer to make a statement now without a lawyer?
A. Which is quicker?
Q. It would be quicker if you gave a statement now, but, however, if you
want a lawyer, we will wait and get a lawyer for you.
A. No, no. I do not want a lawyer.
Q. I just want to make it clear. You know you have a right to have an attorney
present with you?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you understand all of those rights I have advised you of?
A. Yes.
Id. at 107-09, 522 N.E.2d at 66-67.
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the deaths of the victims. 3 The Illinois Supreme Court found that
the defendant had "clearly invoked" his right to counsel when the
assistant state's attorney had asked him "whether he wished to talk
to an attorney and have him present with him before and while he
was being questioned, [and] the defendant responded 'Yes.' ' ' 4 The
defendant's response was clear and unequivocal 5 and constituted an
invocation of counsel under Smith v. Illinois.16 The defendant's
conduct which preceded his encounter with the assistant state's
attorney neither diluted his unambiguous invocation of the right to
counsel, nor did his subsequent willingness to make a statement
without counsel detract from his unambiguous invocation. 7 The
Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that "[sltatements by an accused
following a clear request for counsel ... are irrelevant in determining
whether there has been an effective invocation of that right." 8 The
court concluded that the defendant did not waive his right to counsel,
since "he did not initiate further discussion following his request
for counsel." 9 This conclusion is correct under Edwards v. Arizona"
and Oregon v. Bradshaw.9' The total picture of the admonishment
procedure shows that the defendant was confused, and it cannot be
said that he knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional

rights. 92
III.
A.

CONFRONTATION

OF WITNESSES

The United States Supreme Court

The Supreme Court decided three cases during the Survey year
concerning a defendant's rights under the confrontation clause. In
Coy v. Iowa 3 the Court held that placing a screen between a child
sexual assault victim and the accused in court violated the defendant's right to confrontation. Defendant Coy was arrested for sexually assaulting two 13 year old girls. 94 During the trial a screen was

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 109, 522 N.E.2d at 67.
Id. at 110-11, 522 N.E.2d at 67
Id. at 111, 522 N.E.2d at 67.
469 U.S. 91 (1984).
122 Ill.
2d at 111, 522 N.E.2d at 67.
Id. at 112, 522 N.E.2d at 68.
Id. at 113, 522 N.E.2d at 68.
451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983).
122 11. 2d at 113, 522 N.E.2d at 68.
108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
Id. at 2799.
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placed between the girls while testifying and the accused. The courtroom lights where adjusted so the defendant could see the witness,
but the witness could not see him. 95 The Iowa Supreme Court rejected
a challenge based on violation of both the confrontation clause and
96
due process.
Justice Scalia, in an opinion "embellished with references to

and quotations from antiquity," held that the "irreducible literal
meaning of the clause" guaranteed "a right to meet face to face all
those who appear and give evidence at trial."97 Justice Scalia recognized that "face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the
truthful rape victim or abused child; but . . .it may [also] confound

and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a
malevolent adult. "98
The Court left open the question whether any exceptions exist
to this right. The Court also held that the harmless error rule applies
to such violations and remanded for a determination of whether the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 99 Justice Blackmun,
joined by the Chief Justice in dissent, agreed that the confrontation
clause provides "a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial." °° Nevertheless, this preference must "occasionally give way
to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." 10
'
Recognizing the potentially serious consequences of forcing a child
to testify in front of the defendant, Justice Blackmun stated that a
state may properly consider the protection of a child an important
public policy which outweighs the preference for having the defendant within the witness' sight while the witness testifies. 10 2

95. Id. This procedure was authorized by a recently enacted Iowa Statute. IOWA CODE §
910 A. 14 (1987).
96. 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986). The Iowa Supreme Court held that there was no
violation of the confrontation clause because defendant's ability to cross-examine the witnesses
was not impaired by the screen. In addition, the court rejected the due process argument on
the ground that the screening procedure was not inherently prejudicial.
97. 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 2802. Because the defendant's right to confrontation was violated the Court
found it unnecessary to decide his due process claim. Id. at 2803.
99. Id. at 2803. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion with Justice White to note
that the decision does not doom the "efforts of State legislatures to protect child witnesses
[because many of the procedures] involve testimony in the presence of the defendant." Id.
at 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
101. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980)).
102. Id. at 2809. The dissent also rejected the due process challenge because the screening
device "did not brand [defendant] .. .with an unmistakable mark of guilt." Id. at 2810.

HeinOnline -- 13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 529 1988-1989

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

In United States v. Owens'°3 the Supreme Court held that the
confrontation clause is not violated when a witness is unable to
recall the basis for his prior, out-of-court identification of the
defendant. In Owens, John Foster, a correctional counselor at the
federal prison in Lompoc, California, was attacked and brutally
beaten in the head with a metal pipe on April 12, 1982.14 On May
5, 1982, while recuperating in the hospital, Foster identified the
defendant as his attacker from an array of photographs. At trial
eighteen months later, Foster testified he recalled identifying Owens
on May 5, 1982, but admitted he could not remember seeing his
attacker. The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction based
on a confrontation clause challenge'015 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a split among the circuits.
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court declared that "the
Confrontation Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever
way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."' 1°6 Justice
Scalia argued that the defendant could cross-examine Foster to bring
out such matters as bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, or the
very fact that he has a bad memory. Such an opportunity, the Court
held, is sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause. 0 7
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, argued that unlike the
situation where a witness can identify his attacker at trial but cannot
remember the basis for the identification,10 a prior identification
without any basis is not self-impeaching. 1°9 "Foster's inability in
December of 1983 to remember the events of April 1982 in no way
impugned or otherwise cast doubt upon the accuracy or trustworthiness of his memory in May 1982 ...

."110 The dissent concluded

that Foster's memory loss precluded any meaningful cross-examination and thus should have barred the admission of the prior
identification.
103. 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988).
104. Id. at 840-41.
105. 789 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988). The Ninth Circuit also
held that the admission of the prior identification violated Federal Rule of Evidence 802
although this violation was harmless error.
106. 108 S. Ct. at 842 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985)).
107. Id. at 842-43.
108. In Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (per curiam) an expert witness was
allowed to testify and give his opinion at trial although he could not recall the basis for that
opinion. The dissent argued that in Fensterer the witness' memory loss was self-impeaching.
109. 108 S. Ct. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
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In Olden v. Kentucky'I' the Court held, in a per curiam opinion,
that a trial court's refusal to allow a black defendant in a rape,
kidnapping and sodomy trial to cross-examine the white complainant
concerning her cohabitation with a black boyfriend violated the
defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. The complainant, Starla Mathews, alleged she was kidnapped and raped by the
defendant after he lured her into his car by telling her a friend of
hers had been in an automobile accident." 2 Defendant argued consent
and that Mathews invented the story to protect her relationship with
her boyfriend after he saw her leaving Olden's car." 3 The jury
of sodomy but acquitted him of kidnapping
convicted ldefendant
4
"
rape.
and
While the proposed cross-examination of the complainant was
outside the state's rape-shield statute," 5 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals believed that revealing Mathews' interracial relationship
would prejudice the jury against her. The court held this danger
6
outweighed defendant's right to effective cross-examination."
The Supreme Court stated that the limitation imposed on defendant's right to cross-examination was beyond reason. "Speculation as to the effect of the jurors' racial biases [could not] justify
exclusion of cross-examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of Mathews' testimony.""17 The Court held that,
because Mathews' testimony was "crucial to the prosecution's case,"
they could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the restriction of defendant's right to cross-examination was harmless error." 8
The impact of Olden on the future of rape shield laws is uncertain.
The Court may have taken the opportunity to summarily reverse
defendant's conviction because of the particularly compelling facts.
On the other hand, it is possible the Court is indicating rules of
evidence cannot be used mechanically to prevent a criminal defendant
from presenting highly relevant evidence in his defense.

111. 109 S. Ct. 480 (1988).
112. Id. at 481. Mathews changed her story several times. Originally she told police she
had been raped by four men. Later she claimed it was only two men. At trial, she testified
defendant was the only rapist. In addition, she testified at trial that defendant threatened
her with a knife, however, she had not previously stated defendant had been armed. Id.
113. 109 S. Ct. at 481-82.
114. Id. at 482.
115. Id.(citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985)).
116. 109 S. Ct. at 483.
117. Id.at 483.
118. Id. at 484.
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The Illinois Supreme Court

A significant sixth amendment confrontation of witnesses issue
and a related Bruton" 9 redaction issue were raised in two related
cases, People v. Cruz'2 0 and People v. Hernandez.12' Cruz and
Hernandez were jointly tried before a jury and convicted of murder
and several other offenses. A third defendant was also tried at the
joint trial, but the jury could not reach a verdict as to him. Following
separate sentencing hearings, Cruz and Hernandez each received a
death sentence. In separate appeals, the supreme court held that
both defendants were denied fair trials because their out-of-court
statements were introduced at the joint trial. Although the statements
of Cruz and Hernandez were redacted to eliminate the names of the
codefendants, and in place of such names the terms "friends" and
"named individuals" were used, the supreme court found that the
redactions were insufficient. The court pointed out that the prosecution called certain witnesses for the sole purpose of showing that
the three codefendants were friends, and in closing argument, the
prosecutor implied that the friendship of the defendants allowed the
jury to consider the statements against the other defendants.
In Cruz, the court said:
In light of the prosecution's evidence relating solely to the friendship
of the codefendants . . ., as well as its attempts during closing
argument to lead the jury to connect defendant with Hernandez'
statements, we find a deliberate and constitutionally unacceptable
attempt by the prosecution to circumvent the strictures of Bruton
22
and the confrontation clause.
In Hernandez, the court said: "The defendant here was plainly
incriminated by the reference to 'friends' not only because of the
State's repetitive attempts to establish friendship but also by the
prosecutor's closing argument, in which he linked the 'friends'
23
evidence to admissions made by Cruz and the defendant."'
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the use of the term
"friends" in the statements was "thinly veiled," constituted obvious

119. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (sixth amendment right to confrontation
is violated when prosecutor offers the out-of-court statements of a nontestifying codefendant
which inculpate the defendant).
120. 121 Il.2d 321, 521 N.E.2d 18, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 177 (1988).
121. 121 Il.2d 293, 521 N.E.2d 25, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 177 (1988).
122. Cruz, 121 Ill.
2d at 333, 521 N.E.2d at 23-24.
123. Hernandez, 121 Ill.
2d at 313, 521 N.E.2d at 34.
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references to the codefendants, and that "it would be unrealistic in
the extreme to expect a jury to ignore the clear import of the
24
[codefendant's] statements, despite their redaction."1

The supreme court also noted that the prosecutor brought out
the fact that the statements had been redacted. In Cruz the court
stated:
Informing jurors that statements have been redacted can itself be
grounds for a mistrial and, in this case, put the jurors on notice
that the testimony was being edited to protect someone involved
in. the trial, encouraging them to speculate as to the missing
names. '2
In Hernandez the court stated:
On notice that the defendants' admissions were being edited, it was
not difficult for the jurors to recognize the connection between the
prosecutors' repeated elicitation of testimony that the three
defendants were friends, and the use of "friends" in testimony
126
regarding statements made by Cruz and the defendant.
Because the evidence against the defendants was not overwhelming,
albeit limiting instructions were given, the use of the statements was
not harmless error.

IV.

PRE-TRIAL IDENTIFICATION

In People v. Williams,1 27 the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed a
jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of rape and armed robbery.
On appeal the defendant challenged police station identification
procedures. The facts of the case show that the victim was attacked
in the hallway of an apartment building. The assailant put a knife
to her throat, threatened to kill her, and pushed her into a laundry
room. He then blindfolded, tied, and raped her. A friend of the
victim called the police when she failed to appear. The defendant
was arrested later in the apartment building. Shortly thereafter the
victim was taken to the police station where she identified the
defendant's photograph on an identification card as the person who
had attacked her. She subsequently made line-up and in-court identifications of the defendant. The defendant contended that the

124.
125.
126.
127.

Cruz, 121 I11.2d at 332, 521 N.E.2d at 23.
Id. at 334, 521 N.E.2d at 24 (citation omitted).
Hernandez, 121 I1. 2d at 316, 521 N.E.2d at 36.
118 I1. 2d 407, 515 N.E.2d 1230 (1987).
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victim's viewing of his identification card at the police station was
a suggestive procedure Which tainted her later identifications of him.
The supreme court rejected the challenge finding that the victim's identification of the defendant from his photograph was reliable. The court pointed to various factors which existed in this case:
the victim viewed her attacker in good lighting conditions, saw his
face for several seconds, and looked at the photograph within an
hour and a half after the incident. The court further noted that
there was "little, if any, prompting" of the victim to make an
identification. "The only suggestion of that came in testimony that
a police officer showed the card to the victim and asked her if she
28
recognized the person in the photograph."
V.
A.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

At Psychiatric Evaluations

In Satterwhite v. Texas129 the Supreme Court held that the
harmless error rule applies to violations of an accused's right to
consult with counsel before submitting to psychiatric evaluations to
determine future dangerousness in capital cases. 30 On March 15,
1979, John Satterwhite was charged with murdering Mary Francis
Davis during a robbery. 3 ' Satterwhite was appointed counsel sometime between his indictment on April 4th and his arraignment on
April 13th. On May 3, 1979, Dr. James P. Grigson,3 2 a psychiatrist,
examined Satterwhite and found he has "a severe antisocial personality disorder and is extremely dangerous and will commit future
acts of violence.' ' 3 Satterwhite's counsel was not notified of the
examination and Dr. Grigson testified at Satterwhite's capital sentencing hearing over defense counsel's objection. Satterwhite was
sentenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
defendant's sixth amendment rights were violated but concluded
"the error was harmless because a reasonable jury would have found

128. Id. at 414, 515 N.E.2d at 1233.
129. 108 S. Ct. 1792 (1988).
130. In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Court first recognized that defendants
charged with capital crimes have a sixth amendment right to consult with counsel prior to
submitting to psychiatric examinations to determine their future dangerousness.
131. 108 S. Ct. at 1795.
132. Interestingly, the controversy in Estelle v. Smith also centered on the testimony of
Dr. Grigson. Id. at 1796.
133. Id.at 1795.
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the properly admitted evidence sufficient to sentence Satterwhite to
34
death."1
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, agreed
Satterwhite's sixth amendment rights were violated. Justice O'Connor distinguished prior cases holding the harmless error rule does
not apply to sixth amendment violations on the ground that the
errors in those cases "contaminated the entire criminal proceeding."' 35 In contrast, the deprivation of the right to counsel in this
case was limited to the admission of Dr. Grigson's testimony. The
Court reversed because they could not say beyond a reasonable
doubt that Dr. Grigson's expert testimony .
did not influence the
36
sentencing jury.
Justice Marshall, writing a concurring opinion, argued that
because of the inherent moral judgment a capital sentencing jury
makes, combined with their substantial discretion, the harmless error
rule should not apply at capital sentencing hearings.' 3 7 Nevertheless,
Justice Marshall stated that assuming it does apply to some constitutional errors at capital sentencing hearings, it should never apply
to a violation of Estelle v. Smith. 3 8
Justice Marshall reached this conclusion by reasoning that the
potential for actual prejudice from such a violation is very great.
Additionally, it is almost impossible to measure the degree of prejudice arising from the failure to notify counsel of a psychiatric
examination. These factors, together with the heightened concern
for accuracy in capital cases, require a per se rule of reversal for
violations of Estelle. 39
B.

Effectiveness Of Representation

In People v. Emerson,'40 the defendant was convicted by a jury
of murder, attempted murder, aggravated arson, and two counts of
armed robbery and sentenced by the same jury to death. On appeal
he claimed that his attorney rendered ineffective representation.1'

134. 726 S.W.2d 81, 92-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
135. 108 S. Ct. at 1798. The cases Justice O'Connor distinguished were Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); and Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
136. 108 S. Ct. at 1799.
137. Id. at 1801 (Marshall, J., concurring).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1802.
140. 122 111.2d 411, 522 N.E.2d 1109 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 246 (1988).
141. To sustain such a claim under the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution,
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The defendant complained, inter alia, that counsel in closing argument had conceded his guilt for the murder charge. ,42 The defendant
argued that the jurors could have construed counsel's statement, "I
can still look you in the eye with all this evidence and say this. That
I don't believe that two people went into that place that night with
the idea to commit an armed robbery," to mean that counsel was
unable to say that he did not believe that his client was guilty of
murder. 43 The defendant also argued that the jurors may have
construed counsel's statement at the end of the argument, that "all"
he was asking the jurors to do was to acquit the defendant of the
armed robbery counts, to mean that counsel was conceding his
client's guilt for the other offenses, including the murder charge.
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected his claim because counsel's
argument did not constitute "a direct, unequivocal concession of
the defendant's guilt of the primary charge against him . ...

the defendant must prove a deficiency in counsel's performance and prejudice. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
142. In closing argument at trial, counsel told the jurors:
Ladies and gentlemen, this case has become bizarre, in and out. A state of confusion
during this trial as I suppose you can tell due to the fact that my client and I have
disagreement-disagreements about how the case should be tried. And, of course,
as you heard, the testimony of his brother that you heard a few moments ago was
something that no one heard, including myself and his [i.e., Jackson's] own lawyer
until the time he took the stand and gave it. But as long as this man's life is in
my hands, I'm going to do my best to save his life.
I can still look you in the eye with all this evidence and say this. That I don't
believe that two people went into that place that night with the idea to commit an
armed robbery. And there's a difference between just a simple murder and felony
murder. I know it sounds terrible, but in our law, there's a difference between
when a man commits murder and when a man commits murder in the course of a
felony.
If you have any doubts about the counts of armed robbery which will be
submitted to you in this case with respect to Dennis Emerson, please, at this point,
find him not guilty of armed robbery. It does make a difference. And as I say, I
don't think that two men planning to go into a saloon, a tavern in this particular
area and planning to commit a robbery, planning to take the weekend proceeds In planning to murder the witnesses so there would be no witnesses to it, you
never call up and announce their arrival. Would never allow this man to leave, go
out and get cigarettes. That's all I'm saying. If this was a murder, it was a murder.
If there is a reasonable doubt that this was a murder committed in the course of
a forcible felony of armed robbery, I'm asking you to so indicate by signing verdict
forms of not guilty with respect to these armed robbery counts. And that's all I'm
asking you. Thank you.
122 Ill.
2d at 428-29, 522 N.E.2d at 1115-16.
143. Id. at 429, 522 N.E.2d at 1116.
144. Id. at 430, 522 N.E.2d at 1116.
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In People v. Pegram,'145 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed an
armed robbery conviction and ordered a new trial where counsel
failed to tender a compulsion instruction to the jury. The defendant
testified that he had been forced at gun point to participate in the
robbery. The court explained:
This testimony certainly satisfied the requirement that a defendant,
to raise an affirmative defense, "must present some evidence
thereon." The principal contested issue here was whether the
defendant had been forced, under threat of immediate harm, to
participate in the robbery. Yet, no jury instruction given addressed
the issue raised by the defense evidence: whether Pegram acted
under compulsion, reasonably believing he was in fear of immediate
bodily harm or death during the armed robbery. On this record it
cannot be said that the jury, not having been instructed on the
defense of compulsion, knew that the defendant's testimony
concerning his fears of immediate harm and being forced by the
two masked men to do the described acts could provide a defense
to the charge of robbery. The jury was not informed that the
prosecution had the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt,
not only the elements of armed robbery, but also that Pegram was
46
not compelled in his conduct.1
Applying the Strickland147 standard for assessing the effectiveness of
counsel's representation, the court concluded that the failure to
tender appropriate jury instructions actually prejudiced the defense
14
8
and thereby denied the defendant a fair trial.
C.

Conflict Of Interests

In People v. Banks, 49 a consolidated appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a criminal defendant is entitled to

145. 124 Ill.
2d 166, 529 N.E.2d 506 (1988).
146. Id. at 173, 529 N.E.2d at 509 (citation omitted).
147. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
148. 124 I11. 2d at 174, 529 N.E.2d at 509-10.
149. 121 I11. 2d 36, 520 N.E.2d 617 (1987). Banks was convicted in the circuit court of
Cook County of murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, attempted armed robbery,
and aggravated battery. On appeal, he was represented by the Cook County Public Defender's
office. The appellate court reversed the attempted murder convictions but affirmed his
conviction on all other charges. Banks filed a pro se post-conviction petition, alleging
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and requested the appointment of counsel other
than the public defender. The request was denied and the trial judge appointed an assistant
Cook County public defender to represent him.
Blakes was convicted in the circuit court of Peoria County of unlawful use of weapons.
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the appointment of an attorney other than a public defender in
challenging the effectiveness of trial or appellate representation
rendered by an attorney from the same public defender office. The
defendants argued that a per se conflict of interest exists if an
assistant public defender claims in a post-trial motion, on appeal,
or in post-conviction proceedings that another assistant public defender previously rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, reasoning that the successor public defender would per se labor under
divided and conflicting interests-loyalty to his client versus loyalty
to the public defender office. The court rejected the per se approach,
opting instead for a case-by-case review for the presence or absence
of an actual conflict of interest. 50 The court stated:
[I]t is not clear to us that where an assistant public defender asserts
the incompetency of another assistant, the reputation of the whole
office is negatively impacted. To the contrary, it can be equally
argued that a positive image is fostered where an office aggressively
pursues allegations made against some of its members. More
importantly, however, a per se rule would require us to presume
that public defenders would allow any office allegiances to interfere
with their foremost obligation to their clients. In our view, it is
erroneous to assume that public defenders have such an allegiance
and are unable to subordinate it to the interests of their clients. 5'
In rejecting a per se test, the court overruled its own precedents,
People v. Smith 152 and People v. Terry, "I and adopted the rationale
54
of People v. Robinson.

Prior to closing arguments, he informed the judge that he did not believe that the assistant
public defender assigned to his case was affording him adequate representation. At the
defendant's request, the court discharged counsel and appointed another assistant public
defender to represent him in post-trial proceedings. Counsel then filed a motion for a new
trial, alleging that former counsel rendered ineffective assistance. On appeal, the defendant
argued that post-trial counsel had a conflict of interest because he asserted the incompetency
of another assistant public defender from the same office.
DuQuaine was convicted of murder in the circuit court of Cook County. The Cook
County Public Defender represented the defendant on appeal, and the appellate court affirmed
his conviction in an unpublished order. The defendant subsequently filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Cook County
Public Defender was appointed to represent the defendant in post-conviction proceedings,
and the court granted the State's motion to dismiss without an evidentiary hearing.
150. Id. at 44, 520 N.E.2d at 621.
151. Id. at 43, 520 N.E.2d at 620.
152. 37 I11.2d 622, 230 N.E.2d 169 (1967).
153. 46 I11.2d 75, 262 N.E.2d 923 (1970).
154. 79 Ill. 2d 147, 402 N.E.2d 157 (1979) (no per se conflict of interest for separate
assistant public defenders of the same office to represent codefendants who have antagonistic
defenses).
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In People v. Jones,'55 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed a
sixth amendment right to conflict-free representation claim arising
out of joint representation of codefendants. The court first inquired
under Holloway 116 whether the potential conflict had been brought
to the attention of the trial judge. The court concluded that counsel
did not sufficiently advance a conflict of interest claim.' The court
next examined the issue under the Cuyler18 standard to determine
whether an actual conflict of interest existed which adversely affected
counsel's representation. The court concluded that the mutually
inculpatory pretrial statements of the jointly represented defendants
created an actual conflict of interests which denied one of the
defendants the constitutional right to counsel. Although one defendant had testified at trial, repudiated his prior statement as a product
of coercion, and claimed that neither he nor the codefendant were
involved in the offense, the other defendant did not testify. There
was no way in which the testifying defendant's counsel could effectively deal with the inculpatory statement of the non-testifying
defendant. '9
Another interesting conflict of interests issue arose in People v.
Spreitzer. ° Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of
murder and aggravated kidnapping. A sentencing hearing was held
before a jury and a sentence of death was imposed. The defendant
contended on appeal that his trial counsel, an assistant public
defender, had a per se conflict of interest. The conflict claim was
predicated on the fact that the public defender of the county was

155. 121 Il.2d 21, 520 N.E.2d 325 (1988).
156. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
157. The court stated:
[Tihe issue of a conflict was first raised sua sponte by the trial court after Jones'
statement was read into evidence by an assistant State's Attorney. During the
ensuing bench discussion, defense counsel acknowledged that he had not previously
recognized the "gravity of the conflict in the statements." Defense counsel went
on to state that at that point he "had only planned on putting on one" defendant
to testify. As the trial proceeded only Jones testified, and he repudiated his earlier
statement inculpating Harris and gave testimony corroborating Harris' exculpatory
post-arrest statement. At the close of the People's case, the court invited defense
counsel to move for mistrial if they thought a conflict was present. When proceedings
resumed the next day, defense counsel moved for mistrial, but based the motion
largely on certain surprise testimony of the victim. While the conflict issue was
obliquely referred to, counsel failed to articulate the nature of the conflict, and the
motion for mistrial was denied.
121 I1. 2d at 28-29, 520 N.E.2d at 329.
158. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
159. 121 Ill. 2d at 33-35, 520 N.E.2d at 331-32.
160. 123 Ill. 2d 1, 525 N.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 274 (1988).
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formerly a prosecutor who had been involved in the decision to
charge the defendant in this case. The defendant argued that the
public defender and his assistants were therefore disqualified from
representing him. The supreme court reviewed its previous decisions
regarding conflict of interests and held that there was no conflict
here.
The court said that it would be "ludicrous" to disqualify a
public defender's office from handling cases which were initiated at
a time when the public defender was employed as an assistant state's
attorney. The court went on to say:
[T]he asserted disjunction between [the assistant defender's] duty
to her client and her supposedly conflicting loyalty to [the public
defender] is extremely speculative and remote. We are asked to
believe that [the assistant defender] would refrain from zealously
representing her client because such representation might embarrass
[the public defender] in some way. But [the public defender's] tie
to the prosecution, a tie which was itself fairly tenuous, would be
counterbalanced by his present status as the public defender.
Presumably he was more interested in winning cases currently
assigned to his office than in protecting the integrity of the decisions
he had made when he was a prosecutor. Moreover, the subliminal
reluctance felt by the prosecutor-turned-defense counsel in Kester
towards attacking his own personal decisions would not apply to
[the assistant in this case], who would not have to attack anything
1 61
she had personally done.
Did counsel have a conflict of interest in representing a murder
defendant in guilty pleas proceedings when he had previously represented one of the victims and her parents? In People v. Hillenbrand,162 the Illinois Supreme Court said no. The defendant was
charged with the June 29, 1970, murder of his former girlfriend,
who was the mother of his daughter, and a male companion who
had spent the night with her. The defendant then retained the services
of an attorney, one Edward Rashid, and subsequently plead guilty
on October 19, 1970. Rashid had previously prepared personal and
business income tax returns for the parents of the deceased girlfriend,
Patricia Pence. She and the defendant had operated a restaurant,
and Rashid prepared their tax returns. Rashid also represented
Patricia's father in a marriage dissolution action against his wife,

161. Id. at 22, 525 N.E.2d at 38 (emphasis in original).
162. 121 Ill. 2d 537, 521 N.E.2d 900 (1988).
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however, that representation had concluded prior to the murders.
Rashid also represented Patricia's father on a gambling charge prior
to the murders. Rashid did not receive large fees from Patricia or
her parents, and he volunteered to represent the defendant on the
163
murder charges without a fee.

The court first addressed the question whether counsel had a
contemporaneous conflicting professional commitment to another.
This inquiry is essential in determining whether the defendant had
received undivided loyalty of counsel and effective representation as
guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion. The court concluded that counsel "did not have a contemporaneous professional commitment to [Patricia and her parents] that
created a conflict of interest in his representation of the defen64
dant."1
The court next examined the defendant's claim that Rashid had
a financial interest in retaining the favor of the victim's parents. It

rejected the contention because there was no evidence that they still
owed Rashid legal fees. In the absence of such evidence, the court

concluded, the relationship was not active or ongoing. 165 Moreover,
counsel volunteered to represent the defendant without a fee. Under
these circumstances, the court concluded "[it would be unreasonable
to believe that Rashid would volunteer to represent Hillenbrand if
he was concerned about currying the Pences' favor for future
business." 166
D.

Waiver

In Patterson v. Illinois,167 the Supreme Court, in a five-four
decision, resolved a split among lower courts and decided a question

163. Id. at 542-44, 521 N.E.2d at 901-02.
164. Id. at 545, 521 N.E.2d at 903. Rashid had died in 1976. The 1983 testimony of
Rashid's former bookkeeper
established that Rashid regularly represented the Pences from 1965 to early 1970.
He had also represented Patricia Pence on tax matters in connection with the
restaurant, but that representation was concluded long before the murders. Rashid
was not on retainer for the Pences, he had concluded all of his services prior to
representing the defendant on these charges, he was not the only attorney the
Pences consulted, and he derived little of his income from representation of the
Pences.
Id.
165. Id. at 546-47, 521 N.E.2d at 903-04.
166. Id. at 547, 521 N.E.2d at 904.
167. 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988).
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it had previously left open. 16 1 In Patterson, the defendant, a member
of the Vice Lords street gang, was arrested and charged with battery

and mob action. 169 The defendant was informed of his Miranda
rights, waived them, and made incriminating statements. Three days
later the defendant and two others were indicted for the murder of
a rival gang member. After being informed of the indictment the
defendant asked why a fourth gang member was omitted from the
indictments. The defendant was informed of his Miranda rights
again and validly waived them. 170 The defendant then made two
17
inculpatory statements which were used against him at trial. '

On appeal the defendant argued that the Miranda warnings did
not adequately inform him of his sixth amendment right to counsel,
thus his waiver was not "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Miranda warnings

were sufficient to make defendant aware of his sixth amendment
72

right to counsel during post-indictment questioning.

Justice White, writing for the majority, reasoned that the Miranda warnings served to make defendant aware of his sixth amendment right to counsel during questioning, and the consequences of
a decision to waive that right during questioning. 73 The Court

indicated that defendant was unable to indicate with precision what
additional information should have been provided.

74

Justice White

examined the functions a lawyer serves at post-indictment questioning
and stated that the "State's decision to ... commence formal
adversary proceedings against the accused does not substantially
increase the value of counsel to the accused at questioning .. .

168. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 635-36 n.10 (1986); Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 428 n.2 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1977).
169. 108 S. Ct. at 2392,
170. Id. at 2392-93. The defendant was orally informed of his rights by Officer Michael
Greshan, read them, and then initialled each of the five warnings and signed the waiver
form. Assistant state's attorney George Smith later reviewed this procedure with the defendant
and then repeated the entire procedure a second time.
171. Id.
172. 116 II1. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843 (1987). The Illinois Supreme Court followed its
earlier decision in People v. Owens, 102 I11.
2d 88, 464 N.E.2d 261, cert. denied, 469 U.S.
963 (1984), where it held that the Miranda warnings where sufficient to make an accused
aware of his sixth amendment right to counsel during post-indictment questioning. The Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Patterson was discussed in last year's Survey. See Schroeder,
Criminal Procedure, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J. 839, 882-83 (1988).
173. 108 S. Ct. at 2395.
174. Id. at 2396 n.7.
175. Id. at 2398.
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Justice Stevens, writing for three dissenters, discussed the many
cases emphasizing the significance of the formal commencement of
adversary proceedings.1 76 Justice Stevens argued that the Miranda
warnings do not advise a defendant that a lawyer might examine
the indictment for legal sufficiency, be more skillful than the accused
at plea bargaining, or explain the nature of the charges against

him. 177
Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissent reasoning that Edwards
v. Arizona 178 should apply and that after a defendant has been
indicted he cannot be questioned by the authorities unless he initiates
the conversation.1 79 The majority refuted this analysis by arguing
that "[p]reserving the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel is the essence of Edwards
. .. not barring an accused from making an initial election as to
whether he will face the State's officers during questioning with the
aid of counsel, or go it alone."' 8 0
In People v. Johnson,' 8' the defendant represented himself at a
jury trial, was convicted of four counts of murder, and received a
sentence of death. Initially the defendant had retained counsel but
this attorney was allowed to withdraw and the public defender was
appointed. The defendant was first satisfied with this appointment
but on the eve of trial he requested other counsel from outside the
county. This request was denied and the defendant stated that he
would not accept the public defender as his attorney, that he would
not represent himself, and that he would absent himself from the
proceedings. Ultimately, the defendant chose to represent himself.
On appeal, the defendant contended that his waiver of counsel was
invalid-was not knowingly and intelligently made-because the trial
judge had failed to properly advise him of the minimum sentence
as is required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a).' 8 2 He claimed

176. Id. at 2402 (Stevens, J.,dissenting, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) (citing
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)).
177. Id. at 2403.
178. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
179. 108 S. Ct. at 2399 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2394 (emphasis in original).
181. 119 Ill.
2d 119, 518 N.E.2d 100 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2027 (1988).
182. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Waiver of counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court
shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable
by imprisonment without first, addressing the defendant personally in open court,

HeinOnline -- 13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 543 1988-1989

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

that the judge did not tell him that because of a previous murder
conviction he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of natural life
upon conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected his contention

finding that there was substantial compliance with Rule 401(a) and
that the defendant was not prejudiced by this omission.S 3 The court
reasoned that the judge had admonished the defendant that he could

be incarcerated for "a number of years" and that he might receive
a death sentence. Furthermore, the defendant reviewed voir dire

questions which had been drafted by his attorney which made
reference to life imprisonment, and he was present when the pros-

ecution objected to the questions on grounds that life imprisonment
was a mandatory sentence. Lastly, the court noted that the defendant
was "no stranger to criminal proceedings" and standby counsel was
1 4
appointed.
VI.

A.

SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGE

Defense

In People v. Walker," 5 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the automatic substitution of judge provision of
the Criminal Procedure Code. s6 At issue was whether the statute
8 7 of the Illinois Constituviolated the separation of powers clause"
tion. First, the court recognized the importance of this right in
ensuring a fair trial for the criminally accused. The court stated:

informing him of and determining that he understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when
applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior
convictions or consecutive sentences; and
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel
appointed for him by the court.
ILL. S. CT. R. 401(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IOA,
401(a) (1987).
183. 119 IUI.2d at 132, 518 N.E.2d at 106.
184. Id. at 132-33, 518 N.E.2d at 106-107.
185. 119 II1. 2d 465, 519 N.E.2d 890 (1988).
186. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
114-5(a) (1987):
Within 10 days after a cause involving only one defendant has been placed on the
trial call of a judge the defendant may move the court in writing for a substitution
of that judge on the ground that such judge is so prejudiced against him that he
cannot receive a fair trial. Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed
no further in the cause but shall transfer it to another judge not named in the
motion. The defendant may name only one judge as prejudiced, pursuant to this
subsection; provided, however, that in a case in which the offense charged is a
Class X felony or may be punished by death or life imprisonment, the defendant
may name two judges as prejudiced.
187. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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For the past 114 years, Illinois law has protected the constitutional
right to a fair and impartial trial in criminal cases by providing
for the substitution of a judge who is allegedly prejudiced against
a defendant. Although the procedure for invoking the protections
of the automatic-substitution-of-judge statute has varied over time,
the prophylactic purpose of the statute has remained the same: this
court has consistently held that the statute vests criminal defendants
with the "absolute right" to have an assigned trial judge substituted
upon a timely written motion containing a good-faith allegation
that the judge is prejudiced. The vigor with which this court has
upheld the basic constitutional right to a trial before a fair and
impartial judge is reflected in this court's long held view that the
provisions of the automatic-substitution-of-judge statute should be
construed liberally "to promote rather than defeat," substitution,
and its willingness to find reversible error where the statute is not
so construed.'8"
The automatic substitution of judge provision, concluded the
court, represents the public policy of this state, expressed by the
legislature, that "a defendant should be able to avoid having his
liberty, and perhaps even his life, hang in balance before a judge
whose impartiality he in good faith questions.' ' 8 9 This provision of
the code does not conflict with any supreme court rule or "unduly
invade[ ] the inherent authority of the judiciary."' 190
In People v. Jones,19' the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
automatic substitution of judge section' 92 of the Criminal Procedure
Code does not allow a defendant charged with a capital crime to
file two separate motions for substitution of judge. The statute
contemplates that the defendant may name one or two judges as
prejudiced in a single motion. 93 The court rejected the defendant's
contention that an accused cannot make a meaningful use of the
two-judge option provided by section 114-5(a) unless he already
knows the identity of the first two judges to whom the case would
otherwise be assigned.
The automatic substitution of judge provision was also reviewed
by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Emerson. 194 Emerson's

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

119 Ill. 2d at 470-71, 519 N.E.2d at 891 (citations omitted).
Id. at 480, 519 N.E.2d at 895.
Id. at 482, 519 N.E.2d at 897.
123 Il1. 2d 387, 528 N.E.2d 648 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1174 (1989).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
114-5(a) (1987).
123 Il. 2d at 401-02, 528 N.E.2d at 654-55.
122 Ill. 2d 411, 522 N.E.2d 1109 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 246 (1988).
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murder and other convictions, as well as his death penalty, had been
previously reversed and remanded by the supreme court. On remand
to the circuit court, the case was placed on the trial call of the same
judge who had presided at the first trial. The defendant filed a
motion for automatic substitution of judge within ten days after the
case had been placed on the trial call following the remand. The
trial judge denied the motion holding that the case on remand was
not a new case and that it had been on his call since before the
first trial. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge
and held that for purposes of section 114-5(a), the remand of the
case was a continuation of the original proceedings. Therefore, the
defendant was not entitled to an automatic substitution of judge
195
under section 114-5(a).
B.

Prosecution

In People v. Williams, 196 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a new law which grants prosecutors the right to
substitute a judge on grounds of prejudice. 197 The court rejected the
defendant's claim that the legislation conflicts with Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 21(b). 19 The defendant argued that section 114-5(c)
interferes with the right of the chief judge of each circuit to provide
for the assignment of judges by giving the prosecution a veto power
over any assignments made. The court reasoned that since section
114-5(c) "may be utilized only after assignment of the case to a
particular judge,"'

99

it does not conflict with Rule 21(b). The court

also found that the legislation did not violate separation of powers
principles. It does not impermissibly infringe on the role of the
judicial branch. 200 Lastly, the court held that a defendant cannot
complain of the state's substitution right on due process grounds
reasoning that an accused "does not have the right . . . to have his

case heard by a particular judge." ' 20'

195. Id. at 424, 522 N.E.2d at 1113.
196. 124 Il. 2d 300, 529 N.E.2d 558 (1988).
197. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 1 114-5(c) (1987).
198. Rule 21(b) states:"(b) General Orders. The chief judge of each circuit may enter
general orders in the exercise of his general administrative authority, including orders providing
for assignment of judges, general or specialized divisions, and times and places of holding
court." ILL. S. CT. R. 21(b), ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. l10A,
21(b) (1987).
199. 124 Ill. 2d at 307, 529 N.E.2d at 560 (emphasis in original).
200. Id. at 307, 529 N.E.2d at 561.
201. Id. at 308, 529 N.E.2d at 561.
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VII.

PLEA BARGAINING

Can a prosecutor walk away from an agreed plea agreement?
Apparently so, says the Illinois Supreme Court. In People v. Navarroli,2 2 the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of
cocaine with intent to deliver (a Class X offense) and unlawful
possession of cocaine (a Class 1 offense). Plea negotiations were
held between the defendant and the state's attorney, and subsequently the defendant moved to compel the state's attorney to carry
out the terms of a purported plea agreement. The defendant claimed
that under the terms of the plea agreement he had acted as an
informant in several drug investigations in exchange for the prosecutor's promise to reduce the charges and agree to a sentence of
probation and a fine. The defendant alleged that after he had assisted
law enforcement officials the state's attorney refused to reduce the
charges against him. The prosecutor denied the existence of the
agreement and its terms. 20 3 An evidentiary hearing was held. The
circuit court found the evidence conflicting but determined that an
agreement had been made and that the defendant had fully per24
formed his obligations under the agreement. 0
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, finding that even if a
plea agreement had existed, Navarroli was not entitled to specific
performance. The court reasoned that the defendant was not deprived of his liberty or any constitutionally protected interest in
reliance on the agreement. 20 5 The Illinois Appellate Court also concluded that the circuit court had improperly applied a subjective test
to determine the terms of the agreement.0
The supreme court found it unnecessary to determine whether
a plea agreement in fact existed reasoning that the defendant was
not deprived of due process. 20 7 In reaching this conclusion, the court

202. 121 Il1. 2d 516, 521 N.E.2d 891 (1988).
203. Id. at 519, 521 N.E.2d at 892.

204. The trial judge explained:
Whether or not the prosecution made a specific promise the defendant said it did,
the reasonable inference is that the defendant believed so, and that such belief was
not unreasonable under these circumstances. To preserve the sanctity of justice, the
defendant must prevail. The defendant is entitled to receive probation and a fine.
The reduction of the charge, the length and terms of the probation whether or not
accompanied by incarceration and the amount of the fine are left to the parties
and to the sentencing judge, should the defendant, in fact, plead guilty.
121 Ill. 2d at 520, 521 N.E.2d at 892.
205. 146 Ill. App. 3d 466, 497 N.E.2d 128 (3d Dist. 1986).
206. Id. at 470, 497 N.E.2d at 131.
207. 121 Il. 2d at 522, 521 N.E.2d at 893.
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stated that "[t]he defendant has not entered a plea of guilty in
reliance on the proposed plea agreement. He cannot say he was
deprived of liberty by virtue of the State's refusal to abide by the
terms of the claimed plea agreement. The defendant still has the
option of pleading not guilty and proceeding to trial. ' 20 The court
concluded that the defendant's right to a fair trial remained "unimpaired," and therefore he was not entitled to specific performance
20 9
of the agreement.
VIII.

JURISDICTION

In People v. Caruso,210 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
Illinois authorities had jurisdiction to charge the defendant with
child abduction for detaining his children in the State of Ohio in
violation of an Illinois court order which had granted custody to
his former wife. The defendant contended that Illinois lacked jurisdiction because his conduct was committed in Ohio. The Illinois
Supreme Court determined that Illinois properly asserted criminal
jurisdiction over the defendant's conduct since the charge was based
211
on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of Illinois.
IX.

SPEEDY TRIAL

The effect of a nol-prossed charge for lack of venue on the
defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial was considered in People
v. Goins.2 2 The defendant was taken into custody on July 7, 1983,
in Kane County, Illinois. An indictment was returned against him
in Kane County for residential burglary on the prosecutor's belief
that the burglarized residence was in Kane County. It was later
discovered that the residence was located in DuPage County. The
defendant was charged in DuPage County with residential burglary
on November 22, 1983. On November 30, 1983, the Kane County
charge was nol-prossed, and the defendant was transferred to the
DuPage County jail. On February 23, 1984, prior to his trial in
DuPage County, the defendant moved for a speedy trial discharge. 213

208. Id. at 524, 521 N.E.2d at 894.
209. Id. at 529, 521 N.E.2d at 896.
210. 119 I1. 2d 376, 519 N.E.2d 440 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 83 (1988).
defendant was charged under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
10-5(b)(1) (1987).
211. 119 Ill.
2d at 384, 519 N.E.2d at 443.
212. 119 Il.2d 259, 518 N.E.2d 1014 (1988).
213. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,

1

103-5(a) (1987).
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The trial judge denied the motion, finding that the speedy trial term
had commenced on November 30, 1983, the date on which the circuit
court of DuPage County first had jurisdiction to try the defendant
for the offense. The defendant was convicted of the offense.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The court agreed with the
defendant's contention that the speedy trial term had commenced
on the date he was taken into custody in Kane County, since he
was in custody for the same offense for which he was subsequently
charged and convicted in DuPage County. The court reviewed the
statutory language "shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction
within 120 days" and concluded that this language means "jurisdiction" and not "venue." Therefore, the "circuit court of Kane
County had acquired jurisdiction, though there was no proper
venue. "214 The State contended that even if the circuit court of Kane
County had jurisdiction, the speedy trial term did not begin to run
until the proceedings in Kane County had ended on November 30,
1983. The State argued that a defendant subject to prosecution in
different counties for different offenses is not considered to be in
the custody of the second county until the proceedings in the first
county are terminated. The supreme court rejected this contention,
finding that the charges in Kane County and in DuPage County
were not for separate and distinct offenses. The court stated:
Here it is clear that the Kane and DuPage County indictments
charge the defendant with the identical offense. The DuPage County
indictment does not allege a separate offense but simply cures the
venue defect in the Kane County indictment. To charge the defendant
with the State's delay in ascertaining the county where the alleged
offense was committed would circumvent the protection which the
215
speedy-trial statute was designed to provide.
X.

A.

JURY SELECTION

Peremptory Challenges

A number of Batson21 6 issues have been considered by the Illinois
Supreme Court before. However, in People v. Holland,217 an inter-

214. 119 Ili. 2d at 265, 518 N.E.2d at 1016-17.
215. Id. at 267, 518 N.E.2d at 1017-18.
216. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges
to excuse prospective jurors solely on the basis of their race violates the fourteenth amendment).
217. 121 Ill.
2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989).
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esting standing question was raised. Can a Caucasian defendant
challenge the prosecutor's peremptory challenges excusing two prospective jurors who were black? The supreme court said no on the
ground that he lacks standing to object. "Since [the] defendant is
white and the excluded prospective jurors are black, he is unable to
show that members of his race have been excluded impermissibly.
Thus, he is unable to establish the threshold element of a prima
28
facie Batson violation."
B.

Witherspoon

In People v. Emerson,2 9 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
a Witherspoon22 0 issue. The defendant was convicted by a jury of
murder, attempted murder, aggravated arson, and two counts of
armed robbery. A sentencing hearing was held before the jury and
a sentence of death was imposed. In upholding the death sentence,
the court held that the trial judge did not improperly exclude a
certain juror in violation of Witherspoon.
During jury selection, the trial judge initially asked a group of
prospective jurors whether they would not consider the death penalty
under any circumstances. Several of them, including a Mr. Witvoet,
responded affirmatively. The judge then asked Mr. Witvoet why he
was against the death penalty and Witvoet replied: "Bible says,
'Thou shalt not kill.' It doesn't say any ifs, ands or buts." Later,
when it was Mr. Witvoet's turn for individual examination, the
following exchange occurred:
Judge: "You're one of the gentlemen that said under no circumstances could you possibly impose a death penalty, is that
correct?"
Witvoet: "Right."
Judge: "Okay. You're excused." '221
The supreme court held that the trial judge was justified in concluding from the responses that Witvoet's views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror ..
,222

218. Id. at 157, 520 N.E.2d at 279.
219. 122 I11.
2d 411, 522 N.E.2d 1109 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 246 (1988).
220. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
221. 122 111.
2d at 437-38, 522 N.E.2d at 1120.
222. Id. at 438, 522 N.E.2d at 1120.
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XI.

A.

SENTENCING

Death Penalty

The authority of a prosecutor to seek the death penalty was
challenged in People v. Foster.22a Prior to trial, the defendant filed
a motion alleging that the state's attorney abused his discretion in
seeking the death penalty. The defendant claimed that the death
penalty had not been sought in other cases, albeit the defendants
were eligible for the death penalty, and the facts in those cases were
as egregious as in his case. Additionally, the defendant sought to
subpoena the state's attorney and have him produce a list of his
murder cases in which the death penalty could have been sought.
Finally, the defendant claimed that the state's attorney had sent a
letter to a newspaper in 1982 criticizing a jury's acquittal of the
defendant on a prior burglary charge. The letter, the defendant
argued, was evidence that the state's attorney was improperly motivated by the acquittal to seek the death penalty in the present
prosecution. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion. The
supreme court held that the trial judge did not err in quashing the
subpoena and rejected the defendant's contention. The court stated:
[W]e cannot conclude that the prosecutor's decision to seek the
death penalty was based on circumstances other than the presence
of a statutory aggravating factor and the likelihood that the
sentencing authority would consider imposition of a death sentence.
Given the extreme heinousness of the beating and the sexual assault,
it cannot be convincingly argued that the prosecutor abused discretion
224
in asking for the death penalty.
In People v. Crews, 225 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who is found guilty
but mentally ill (GBMI) 226 does not offend the constitutional ban
against cruel and unusual punishment. The court reasoned that a
"GBMI offender is able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
behavior and is able to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law . . . and [as to him] deterrence and retribution remain valid
227
considerations in his punishment."

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

119 Il1. 2d 69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2044 (1988).
Id. at 93, 518 N.E.2d at 92.
122 Il1. 2d 266, 522 N.E.2d 1167 (1988).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
1005-2-6 (1987).
122 Il. 2d at 281, 522 N.E.2d at 1174.
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An interesting eligibility question was raised in People ex rel.
Daley v. Strayhorn.221 On August 31, 1980, the defendant stabbed
and killed his victim in Chicago. He then went to Rhode Island
where, on January 2, 1982, he murdered again. He was found guilty
of second degree murder by a Rhode Island trial court, sentenced
to imprisonment, and then extradited to Illinois. Following a bench
trial in the circuit court of Cook County in 1986, the defendant was
found guilty of the 1980 murder. 229 The trial judge refused to hold
a death penalty hearing, reasoning that the Illinois murder had
preceded the Rhode Island murder, and that if the defendant had
been tried first in Illinois he would not have been eligible for the
death penalty. The judge then imposed a forty year sentence. The
State sought a writ of mandamus.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in
refusing to hold a death penalty hearing. Relying on People v.
Guest,230 the court rejected the defendant's due process claim. The
court held that it is the sequence of convictions, not the sequence
of the murders, which determines whether the multiple-murder aggravating factor applies. Since the Rhode Island murder conviction
preceded the Illinois conviction, the defendant was eligible for the
death penalty under section 9-1(b)(3). 231 The supreme court also
rejected the defense claim that the defendant was not eligible for
the death penalty because the prior murder conviction arose in a
state which did not have a death penalty. "Section 9-1(b)(3) requires
substantial similarity between our murder statute [Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1]
and the murder statute of another State, not the penalties that may
be imposed by the other State upon a conviction of murder. ' 232 The
court also compared the Illinois murder statute with the Rhode
Island murder statute and concluded that they are substantially
similar .233
Once again the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty statute. In People v. Britz 234 it said "[tihis
court declines to alter our previous holding that the death penalty
' 235
statute contains adequate safeguards.
228. 121 I11. 2d 470, 521 N.E.2d 864 (1988).
229. Id. at 473, 521 N.E.2d at 865.
230. 115 Ill. 2d 72, 503 N.E.2d 255 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3241 (1987).
231. 121 Ill. 2d at 483, 521 N.E.2d at 870. The multiple-murder aggravating factor is
found in ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
9-1(b)(3) (1987).
232. 121 Ill. 2d at 484, 521 N.E.2d at 870.
233. Id. at 488, 521 N.E.2d at 871.
234. 123 Ill. 2d 446, 528 N.E.2d 703 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1100 (1989).
235. Id. at 483, 528 N.E.2d at 720.
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In People v. Johnson,23 6 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the death sentence and rejected a number of challenges. On the issue
of waiver of counsel, the court held that the defendant's pre-trial
waiver of counsel was operative through the sentencing hearing.
"Since the facts in this case do not reveal any change in circumstances which might trigger the necessity to admonish defendant
anew [at the sentencing stage], his alleged waiver of counsel prior
'237
to trial was operative throughout the subsequent proceedings.
The court noted that the trial judge, prior to trial, specifically
advised the defendant that he was entitled to counsel "at all stages
of the proceeding," there was nothing in the record to suggest that
the defendant's pre-trial waiver was only intended as a waiver of
counsel during the guilt stage, the defendant had been previously
convicted of murder and sentenced to death in another case while
represented by counsel, and the fact that he had standby counsel
during the proceedings. This, the court concluded, "belies any claim
' 238
that he was unaware of his right to counsel.
In People v. Davis 3 9 the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the
claim of a black defendant that his death sentence for the murder
of a white person was unconstitutional. In his post-conviction petition, the defendant had alleged that the victim's race made it more
likely that he would receive a death sentence. Relying on the Gross
study, 240 he argued that "a suspect accused of killing a white victim
in Illinois is four times more likely to receive the death penalty than
is a suspect accused of killing a black victim, even after pertinent
nonracial variables have been taken into account."124' Following the
analysis of the United States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 2
the Illinois Supreme Court held that even if the methodology of the
Gross study were sound, the defendant failed to articulate a constitutional claim.
While the rules of evidence may be relaxed in a death sentence
hearing, totally unreliable evidence cannot be introduced against the

236. 119 Ill. 2d 119, 518 N.E.2d 100 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2027 (1988).
237. Id. at 147, 518 N.E.2d at 113.
238. Id. at 145-46, 518 N.E.2d at 112.
239. 119 Ill.
2d 61, 518 N.E.2d 78 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1327 (1989).
240. S. Gross & R. Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital
Sentencing and Homicide Victimization (1983) (unpublished manuscript available at the
Stanford University School of Law Library).
241. 119 Il1. ;d at 65, 518 N.E.2d at 80.
242. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
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defendant. In People v. Rogers,24 1 the prosecutor, over objection,
introduced the tape-recorded confessions of two nontestifying codefendants at the second phase of the sentencing hearing. In these
confessions, the codefendants admitted a limited role in the planning
and commission of the crimes and said that the idea to rob and kill
the victim originated strictly with the defendant. They also claimed
that they attempted to discourage the defendant from committing
the crimes. 244 Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court
in Lee v. Illinois,245 the Illinois Supreme Court labeled the accomplices' confessions presumptively unreliable. In this case, the court
concluded, the "unreliability is particularly strong ... ."246 The
court remanded the case to the circuit court to conduct a new second
247
phase of the death sentencing hearing.
The use of victim impact statements in a death sentence hearing
was challenged in People v. Simms.248 The Illinois Supreme Court
followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court in Booth v.
Maryland 24 9 in finding constitutional error. At the sentencing hearing
which was held before the trial judge without a jury, four members
of the victim's family testified as to their "grief and deep sense of
loss." The victim's husband testified about his "shattered dreams
and his concerns over raising his three children without their mother."
The victim's parents "expressed how desperately they missed their
daughter and how painful it was to hear their grandchildren ask
'Na Na, where is my mommie?' 25 0
The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
The victim impact evidence in this case is simply too powerful for
a human sentencer to ignore. More explicitly, the trial judge
admitted that the impact on the victim's family was a consideration
in his sentencing decision. Under Booth, admitting this type of
evidence at a capital sentencing hearing clearly violates the
2
defendant's eighth amendment rights. '

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
hearing
250.
251.

123 Il. 2d 487, 528 N.E.2d 667 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 878 (1989).
Id. at 520, 528 N.E.2d at 683.
476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
123 Il. 2d at 521, 528 N.E.2d at 683.
Id. at 523, 528 N.E.2d at 684.
121 Ill. 2d 259, 520 N.E.2d 308 (1988).
107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987) (introduction of victim impact statements at death sentencing
violates the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment).
121 Ill. 2d at 272, 520 N.E.2d at 314.
Id. 272-73, 520 N.E.2d at 314.
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Although the claim was not raised in the post-sentencing motion,
25 2
the introduction of the evidence was plain error.
B.

Sentencing Factors

In People v. Martin,253 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed an
important question concerning sentencing factors. The defendant
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to five
years imprisonment. In imposing sentence, the trial judge considered
in aggravation that "in committing the felony the defendant inflicted
serious bodily injury to another resulting in death. ' 25 4 The supreme
court held that the trial judge's consideration of this factor constituted plain error. The court reasoned that since the legislature took
the victim's death into, account when it set the range of permissible
penalties for the crime, it was improper to consider it again as a
255
justification for imposing a greater penalty.
In People v. Young,25 6 the Illinois Supreme Court held that on
a remand for reconsideration of a natural life sentence the defendant
25 7
is not entitled to a supplemental presentence report.
C.

Probation

An unusual "credit" issue was addressed by the Illinois Supreme
Court in People v. Williams.28 The defendant was sentenced to
probation. With less than three months remaining on the sentence,
the prosecutor filed a petition to revoke. About eight months later,
following a hearing, the petition was dismissed. The defendant then
requested the trial judge to find that the probation term had expired.
The trial judge found that ch. 38, section 1005-6-4(a)(3) barred credit
for time served by a defendant on probation during the pendency
of a revocation petition, but held that this section was "completely
unfair" and unconstitutional. 25 9 The State appealed. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that the trial judge misconstrued section 10056-4(a)(3). The court held that this section does not bar credit for
time served on probation after the filing and service of a revocation

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 272, 520 N.E.2d at 314.
119 Ill.
2d 453, 519 N.E.2d 884 (1988).
Id. at 461, 519 N.E.2d at 888.
Id. at 460, 519 N.E.2d at 887.
124 Ill.
2d 147, 529 N.E.2d 497 (1988).
Id. at 153-57, 529 N.E.2d at 499-502.
119 Ill. 2d 24, 518 N.E.2d 136 (1987).
Id. at 25, 518 N.E.2d at 136.

HeinOnline -- 13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 555 1988-1989

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

petition. The court reasoned that it would be anomalous to find
probation tolled for purposes of giving credit while requiring a
defendant to continue to comply with the conditions of his probation. Thus, when probation is not revoked, as in this case, the
defendant is automatically entitled to credit for the time he had
served on probation after the summons for revocation issued. If
probation is revoked, the defendant is entitled to such credit, unless
the trial judge orders otherwise.
D. Parole
In Faheem-El v. Klincar,260 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the parole term for persons who were sentenced between January 1,
1973, and February 1, 1978, to indeterminate sentences runs until
the expiration date of the maximum sentence imposed. Additionally,
such persons are subject to a mandatory parole term after the
maximum sentence is satisfied.
XII.
A.

POST-CONVICTION HEARING ACT

Summary Dismissal

In People v. Porter,26 1 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the summary dismissal provision of the Post Conviction
Hearing Act, 262 which permits a post-conviction judge to dismiss a
"frivolous" or "patently without merit" petition without the appointment of counsel. The court rejected equal protection, 26 due
process, 264 and separation of powers 265 challenges in finding the
statute constitutional.
B.

Successive Petitions

May a defendant file successive post- onviction petitions? In
People v. Free,266 the Illinois Supreme Court answered no. But this
is not an ironclad rule. If the defendant can demonstrate that the

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

123 Il1. 2d 291, 527 N.E.2d 307 (1988).
122 Ill. 2d 64, 521 N.E.2d 1158, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 102 (1988).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
122-2.1 (1987).
122 Ill. 2d at 78, 521 N.E.2d at 1163.
Id. at 74-78, 521 N.E.2d at 1161-63.
Id. at 73, 521 N.E.2d at 1160-61.
122 Il. 2d 367, 522 N.E.2d 1184, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 190 (1988).
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proceedings on the original petition were "fundamentally deficient,"
26
the successive petition may be litigated.
C.

Limitation Period

In People v. Bates,268 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
shorter ten year limitation period 269 for filing a post-conviction
petition is to be applied retroactively. In this case, the defendant
was convicted of murder in 1972. At that time the limitation period
for filing a post-conviction petition was twenty years. In February
1984, the defendant filed a post-conviction petition which was dismissed by the trial judge because it had not been filed within the
ten year limitation period. The supreme court upheld the dismissal
of the petition, stating that the shortened limitation period "should
'270
apply retroactively to the defendant's petition.
D. Discovery
In People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald,27
r
the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed a significant question of first impression concerning
the availability of discovery depositions in post-conviction proceedings. Larry Davis filed a post-conviction petition in the circuit court
of Cook County. His attorney then issued subpoenas for the taking
of discovery depositions of a number of individuals who were
involved in the original criminal proceeding. Notices of depositions
were given to the state's attorney. After the first deposition had
been taken, the prosecutor moved to quash the remaining subpoenas.
The post-conviction judge denied the motion, ruling that civil discovery procedures apply to post-conviction proceedings and that the
state's attorney had failed to show cause to quash the subpoenas.
On reconsideration of the ruling, the judge ruled that "the taking
of discovery depositions in a post-conviction proceeding was discretionary. ' 272 The judge granted Davis leave to take the depositions
of two other witnesses who had been subpoenaed and allowed the
state's attorney's motion to quash the subpoenas for the remaining
witnesses.

267.
268.
269.
years).
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 376, 522 N.E.2d at 1188.
124 Il1. 2d 81, 529 NE.2d 227 (1988).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
122-1 (1987) (effective January 1, 1984) (previously twenty
124 I11.2d at 86, 529 N.E.2d at 229.
123 I11. 2d 175, 526 N.E.2d 131 (1988).
Id. at 178, 526 N.E.2d at 132.
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The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the rulings of the postconviction judge and rejected the state's attorney's contention that
the judge had exceeded his authority in ordering discovery depositions. The prosecutor argued that a post-conviction judge may
authorize the taking of evidence depositions but not discovery depositions. 273 The supreme court concluded that "the taking of discovery depositions in post-conviction proceedings is not a matter governed
by our rules respecting discovery in criminal or civil actions and
that the trial judge in this case acted within his inherent authority
in permitting the discovery depositions to be taken. ' 27 4 The court
recognized that the statute is silent on the availability of discovery
depositions. 27' The court also noted that it had previously promulgated rules of discovery for civil and criminal litigation 276 but con2 77
cluded that these rules do not pertain to post-conviction litigation.
The court reasoned that post-conviction proceedings are sui generis.278 "Neither authorized nor prohibited by rule or statute, the
discovery order entered here was, we believe, within the trial judge's
279
inherent authority. 1
The court elaborated:
Because post-conviction proceedings afford only limited review,
and because there would exist in those proceedings a potential for
abuse of the discovery process, we caution that a circuit judge
should exercise the inherent authority to allow the taking of discovery
depositions only after a hearing, on motion of a party, for good
cause shown. In deciding whether to permit the taking of a discovery
deposition, the circuit judge should consider, among other relevant
circumstances, the issues presented in the post-conviction petition,
the scope of the discovery sought, the length of time between the
conviction and the post-conviction proceeding, the burden that the
deposition would impose on the opposing party and on the witness,
20
and the availability of the desired evidence through other sources.
The court concluded that in this case the post-conviction judge had
correctly evaluated the requests for discovery depositions. Since the

273. Id.
and People
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
(criminal)).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.

at 178-79, 526 N.E.2d at 133 (relying on ILL.

REV. STAT. ch. 38,

122-6 (1985)

v. Rose, 48 Ill. 2d 300, 268 N.E.2d 700 (1971)).
at 179, 526 N.E.2d at 133.
at 180, 526 N.E.2d at 133-34 (107 II1. 2d Rules 201-22 (civil) and Rules 411-15
at
at
at
at

180, 526 N.E.2d at
181, 526 N.E.2d at
183, 526 N.E.2d at
183-84, 526 N.E.2d

134.
134.
135.
at 135.
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judge had "exercised his discretion in allowing [two] depositions
while denying the others, we will not interfere . . with his decision. "281

XIII.

APPEALS

In People v. Wilk, 282 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the
requirement of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) 283 as a condition
for an appeal from a guilty plea. Each of the defendants in this
consolidated case was represented by counsel, pleaded guilty, and
sought to appeal by filing a notice of appeal without first filing a
motion to withdraw the plea. The Illinois Appellate Court, in each
case, dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with Rule 604(d).
The defendants contended in the supreme court that their attorneys'
failure to comply with Rule 604(d) constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel and that the appellate court, rather than dismiss the
appeals, should have granted their requests for remand to the trial
court for an opportunity to file a motion to withdraw the pleas.
The supreme court rejected this approach reasoning that "the rules
adopted by this court concerning criminal defendants and guilty
pleas are in fact rules of procedure and not suggestions. 28 4 The
court stated that "Rule 604(d) establishes a condition precedent for
an appeal from a defendant's plea of guilty. ' 285 The appellate court
therefore properly dismissed the appeals. The court further held that
the appropriate remedy for the defendants lies under the PostConviction Hearing Act. The court stated:
Under the circumstances such as those involved in these cases in a
post-conviction petition, the defendant pro se needs only to allege
a violation of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, due to the attorney's failure to preserve appeal rights, and
allege whatever grounds he or she would have had to withdraw his
or her plea of guilty had a proper motion to withdraw been filed

281. Id. at 184, 526 N.E.2d at 135.
282. 124 Ill. 2d 93, 529 N.E.2d 218 (1988).
283. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) provides:
Appeal by Defendant From a Judgment Entered Upon a Plea of Guilty. No appeal
from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant,
within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. The motion shall
be in writing and shall state the grounds therefor.
107 111.2d R. 604(d).
284. 124 II. 2d at 103, 529 N.E.2d at 221.
285. Id. at 105, 529 N.E.2d at 222.
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by defendant's counsel prior to the filing of a notice of appeal.
At the hearing on the post-conviction petition, the two-pronged
test laid down in Strickland v. Washington [466 U.S. 668 (1984)]
will apply to determine if in fact the defendant has been deprived
286
of effective assistance of counsel.

XIV.

A.

MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES

Preservation of Evidence

In Arizona v. Youngblood27 the Supreme Court addressed the
duty of the police to preserve evidence that may be useful to a
criminal defendant. The defendant was arrested for the sexual assault
of a ten year old boy. The police refrigerated the evidence collected
with a "sexual assault kit," but failed to refrigerate the victim's
semen-stained clothing. Thus, neither the criminologist for the State
nor the defense's expert witness could determine the attacker's blood
group from the semen stains. The trial court instructed the jury that
if they found the State had destroyed or lost evidence, they might
"infer that the true fact is against the State's interest." 288 The jury
convicted the defendant of child molestation, sexual assault, and
kidnapping. 2 9 The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
"when identity is an issue at trial and the police permit the destruction of evidence that could eliminate the defendant as the perpetrator, such loss is material to the defense and is a denial of due
process.'"290

The Supreme Court, in a divided opinion, reversed. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that "unless a criminal
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of
due process of law." ' 291 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:

286. Id. at 107-08, 529 N.E.2d at 223.
287. 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).

288. Id. at 335.
289. Id. at 334.
290. State v. Youngblood, 153 Ariz. 50, 54, 734 P.2d 592, 596 (1986).
291. 109 S. Ct. at 337. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, stating that there may
be cases where, not withstanding the good or bad faith of the police, the loss or destruction
of evidence may be so critical to the defense as to "make a criminal trial fundamentally
unfair." Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). However, this was not such a case
because the jury was instructed that they could consider the lost evidence against the State.

Id.
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We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part
of the police both limits the extent of the police's obligation to
preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class
of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e.,
those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate
that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.2 92
The Chief Justice distinguished Brady v. Maryland,2a which held
that the good or bad faith of the State is irrelevant when the State
fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence, on
the ground that Youngblood involved no more than "the failure of
the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be
said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of
294
which might have exonerated the defendant.
B.

Entrapment

In Mathews v. United States295 the Supreme Court resolved a
split among the circuit courts and held that a defendant in a federal
criminal prosecution can raise an entrapment defense although he
denies one or more elements of the crime. The defendant, an
employee of the Small Business Administration in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was charged with accepting a gratuity in exchange for an
official act. 296 The district court refused to allow defendant to raise
the defense of entrapment because he refused to admit all the
elements of the offense charged. The Seventh Circuit affirmed,
stating that the defense of entrapment is "inconsistent per se with
the defense that the defendant never had the requisite criminal

intent.

'297

The Supreme Court reversed, drawing an analogy to civil cases
where a party can raise inconsistent claims or defenses. Chief Justice

292. Id.
293. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
294. 109 S. Ct. at 337. Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. Justice Blackmun stated that "where no comparable evidence is likely
to be available to the defendant, police must preserve physical evidence of a type that they
reasonably should know has the potential, if tested, to reveal immutable characteristics of
the criminal, and hence to exculpate a defendant charged with the crime." Id. at 343
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Applying this standard to the facts of the instant case, the dissent
concluded that the "failure of the prosecution to preserve this evidence deprived [Youngblood]
of a fair trial." Id. at 345.
295. 108 S. Ct. 883 (1988).
296. Id. at 885.
297. Mathews v. United States, 803 F.2d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 883
(1988).
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Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that "even if the defendant
denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an
entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable jury could find entrapment. '291
Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun in dissent, stated
that because entrapment is only available to a defendant who has
committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, when the defendant denies one or more of the elements of the offense entrapment
is a proper defense only if the accused is lying. 299 Justice White
argued that the increased risk of perjury and possible confusion
among juries were sufficient reasons to prevent a defendant who
denies committing the offense from raising an entrapment defense. 3°°
C. Sanction for Discovery Violations
In Taylor v. Illinois,30 the Supreme Court held that the exclusion
of a defense witness from testifying as a sanction for violation of a
pretrial discovery request is not absolutely prohibited by the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment. Defendant Taylor
was convicted of attempted murder. Prior to trial defendant's attorney had named four possible witnesses in response to the prosecution's discovery request. 02 On the first day of trial the defense
counsel amended his answer by adding the names of two other
possible witnesses. On the second day defense counsel once again
attempted to amend his answer and add the names of two witnesses.
Counsel stated that "he had just been informed [of these witnesses]
and that they had probably seen the 'entire incident."' 3 3
Upon cross-examination during an offer of proof, one witness
testified that defense counsel had visited him at home the week
before the trial began. The trial court excluded the witness' testimony
as a sanction for the "willful violation of the [discovery] rules."
The court also stated he had "a great deal of doubt as to the
298. 108 S.Ct. at 886. Justice Brennan, while concurring in the Court's opinion, reiterated
his belief that the entrapment defense should focus solely on the government's conduct. Id.
at 888-89 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, in a second concurring opinion, argued
that the entrapment defense will rarely be genuinely inconsistent with the defense on the
merits. However, when genuine inconsistency exists it will be "self-penalizing." Id. at 889
(Scalia, J., concurring).
299. Id. at 890-91 (White, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 891-92.
301. 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988).
302. Id. at 649.
303. Id.
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veracity [of this witness]. ''34 The exclusion of the witness was
affirmed on appeal as within the discretion of the trial court. 05
In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court
began by dismissing the State's argument that the compulsory process
clause only guarantees a defendant's right to subpoena witnesses
and does not apply to rulings on admissibility of evidence. 3°6 Justice
Stevens stated that "[tihe right to compel a witness' presence ...
could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not
embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by the trier
3' 0 7
of fact.
The Court then turned to the defendant's argument that the
sixth amendment prohibits the exclusion of the testimony of a
surprise witness. Justice Stevens noted that "[djiscovery, like crossexamination, minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated
on incomplete, misleading, or even deliberately fabricated testimony."3 8 The Court then quoted United States v. Nobles"09 for the
proposition that "[tihe Sixth Amendment does not confer the right
to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversary system; one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have been a half-truth."310 The
Court concluded by stating that defense counsel's conduct harmed
the "integrity of the judicial process itself" and that the instant case
fit into that category of willful misconduct which justifies the severest
sanction.31'
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
dissented. Justice Brennan argued that excluding evidence distorts
the truth seeking process discovery is intended to serve.' 2 When the
client is not personally responsible for the discovery violation, al-

304. Id. at 650.
305. 141 Il1. App. 3d 839, 491 N.E.2d 3 (1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988).
306. 108 S. Ct. at 651-52.
307. Id. at 652.
308. Id. at 653-54. Justice Stevens noted that the compulsory process clause differs from
other sixth amendment rights because it is entirely dependent on the defendant's initiative.
309. 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (testimony of defendant's expert witness properly excluded as a
sanction for refusing to permit discovery of a "highly relevant" report).
310. 108 S. Ct. at 654.
311. Id. at 656.
312. Id. at 658-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Addressing a procedural issue, Justice Brennan
concluded that defendant had waived his constitutional claims by not raising them in his
motion for a new trial. However, because Illinois courts can disregard a procedural default
in exceptional cases, the failure of the state court to exercise that power does not bar review
in the Supreme Court. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1955).
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ternative sanctions directed at the attorney are much more effective
in deterring willful violations of discovery rules.31 3 Moreover, granting the p1fosecUtion a continuance and allowing the prosecutor to
comment on the Witfiegs concealment can correct any adverse impact
4
the discovery violation had on the truthseeking process.3 1

313, 108 Sj Ct. at 664-65.
314. Id.at 664.
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